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Probably,  one  test  of the  stability  of  the  banking  system  is  to  evalu-
ate  how  risky  assets  are  distributed  across  banks’  portfolios  and  the
implications  for the  contagion  via  interbank  relations.  This  paper
explores  theoretically  a  bank  sector  with  risks  concentration  and
the  functioning  of  interbank  markets.  It employs  a simple  model
where  banks  are  exposed  to  both  credit  and  liquidity  risk  that
suddenly  correlate  over  the  business  cycle.  We  show  that  risk  con-
centration  makes  interbank  market  breakdowns  more  likely  and
welfare  monotonically  decreases  in  risk  concentration.
© 2015  Elsevier  Inc.  All  rights  reserved.
1. Introduction
A key feature of the 2007–2008 ﬁnancial crisis has been the disruption and prolonged malfunc-
tioning of interbank markets (see, e.g. Acharya & Merrouche, 2013; Afonso, Kovner, & Schoar, 2011;
Ciccarelli, Maddaloni, & Peydró, 2013; Heider, Hoerova, & Holthausen, 20101) sometimes related to the
interbank network structure (Georg, 20132). This has come as a surprise to most observers, since inter-
bank markets have been functioning smoothly historically, even in the face of severe stress episodes
∗ Tel.: +39 3356955599.
E-mail address: lucchett@unive.it
1 Ciccarelli et al. (2013) ﬁnd that ﬁnancial intermediaries are extremely fragile in the EU. The ECB effectively partly substituted
the  interbank market and, in turn, induced a subsequent softening of lending conditions.
2 Georg (2013) shows that networks with the central bank that intervene, solving market incompleteness, are more stable
than  random networks.
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such as the LTCM failure (Furﬁne, 2000) and it attaches importance to policy interest rate for loan
portfolio risk and bank liquidity as recent found in Giulioni (2015).
Theoretical research addressing why interbank markets may  not function properly has provided
explanations based on informational and market frictions such as: asymmetric information or mar-
ket incompleteness (e.g. Acharya & Skeie, 2011; Flannery, 1996; Freixas & Jorge, 2008; Georg, 2013;
Gale & Yorulmazer, 2012; Heider et al., 2010); information contagion where the poor performance
of each bank conveys potential bad news about the common factor affecting loan returns (Acharya &
Yorulmazer, 2008); market power (e.g. Acharya, Gromb, & Yorulmazer, 2012; Cai & Thakor, 2008); and
malfunctioning secondary asset markets (e.g. Diamond & Rajan, 2005, 2008; Gorton & Huang, 2004,
2006).
Since the early 2000s, however, there has been increasing evidence of a positive relationship
between measures of systemic risk in major banking systems and bank concentration.3 This evidence
raises the question of whether the correlation of risks possibly induced by higher bank risk concen-
tration could have a signiﬁcant impact on the functioning of interbank markets and welfare, and if so,
why. To our knowledge, this question has not been addressed in the literature. A recent study discuss
the international portfolio diversiﬁcation of Miralles-Marcelo, del Mar  Miralles-Quirós, and Miralles-
Quirós (2015), but aside from the interbank market and the correlation between liquidity risk and
credit risk.
Speciﬁcally, in this paper we explore the implications of banking system risk concentration for the
functioning of interbank markets in a model where banks are exposed to both credit and liquidity risk.
Indeed, as show in Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, and Tehranian (2011), Brunnermeier (2009), Covitz and
Downing (2007) and Ericsson and Renault (2006) credit and liquidity risk may  dramatically correlate
over the business cycle especially during ﬁnancial crisis. Moreover, Da Silva and Divino (2013) show
that credit risk is pro-cyclical and default risk depends on structural features, underlining the banking
regulation role in presence of credit and liquidity shocks.
The line of inquiry of this paper is related to, and builds on, the contributions by Ibragimov, Jaffee,
and Walden (2011) and Wagner (2010, 2011), who show that inefﬁciencies may  arise from individual
bank diversiﬁcation, which does not necessarily result in a more resilient banking system. However,
these papers do not consider interbank markets and multiple sources of risks, such as credit and
liquidity risk, as we do.4
We  build a simple model along the lines of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Bhattacharya and Gale
(1987) models, where banks are exposed to both credit and liquidity risk, and there are no informational
or market frictions. The market failure in our economy is that contracts are incomplete and therefore,
not all risks can be insured. Interbank market breakdowns are deﬁned as parameter conﬁgurations
under which there is no interbank market equilibrium, and banks implement autarkic allocations.
We show that an increase in the concentration of risks, possibly arising from concentrated market
structures, makes interbank markets breakdowns more likely. Differing from the previous literature,
our results are not driven by asymmetric information, market power or dysfunctional secondary mar-
kets. Rather, they are explained by credit and liquidity risks correlation as suddenly happens over the
business cycle. As an example, the ability to diversify these risks may  be prevented by risk management
diseconomies associated with large sizes of ﬁnancial institutions and the wide scope and complexity
of their activities. Indeed, systemically important ﬁnancial institutions (SIFIs) are seen as institutions
3 Group of Ten (2001) concluded that “Evidence suggests that [risk] interdependencies between large and complex banking
organizations have increased over the last decade in the United States and Japan, and are beginning to do so in Europe. Although
a  causal link has not been established, these increases are positively correlated with measures of consolidation.” A positive
relationship between bank concentration and measures of bank systemic risk is found in Boyd, De Nicolò, and Loukoianova
(2009a) and Boyd, De Nicolò, and Jalal (2009b). During the periods of intense consolidation of the last decade, De Nicolò and
Kwast (2002) found increased risk interdependencies among U.S. large and complex banking organizations. Risk proﬁles of
large and complex U.S. and European banks were also found to have increased in the U.S. in Europe, and globally in De Nicolò,
Hayward, and Bhatia (2004a), De Nicolò, Bartholomew, Zaman, and Zephirin (2004b), Stiroh (2004), Hartmann, Straetsman,
and  de Vries (2005), Stiroh and Rumble (2006), and Houston and Stiroh (2006).
4 This paper can be viewed as also indirectly related to the papers by Gai et al. (2011) and Anand et al. (2012), as they analyze
numerically how network connections and different exogenous interbank structures affect banks’ short term funding but do
not  consider banks’ choice of risk concentration and welfare implications, as we do (see Section 6).
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to be carefully monitored by regulator as a potential source of systemic risk (see e.g. ECB Financial
Stability Review, December 2009).
In Section 2 we describe the model. The model set-up captures in stylized form the important
distinction between diversiﬁcation of a banking ﬁrm and diversiﬁcation of the ﬁnancial system empha-
sized and documented empirically by De Nicolò and Kwast (2002). Banks can be perfectly diversiﬁed
individually, but aggregate risk in the banking system can be either perfectly diversiﬁed or concen-
trated across banks. As the system becomes composed of fewer and larger banks, each bank will be more
diversiﬁed individually, but the banking system will be less diversiﬁed, since a larger fraction of banks
is exposed to the same aggregate shocks. In the model, the degree of banking system diversiﬁcation is
parameterized between the two extremes of perfect diversiﬁcation and maximal concentration.
Section 3 deﬁnes the interbank equilibrium. Interbank market breakdowns are simply deﬁned as
situations in which the interbank equilibrium does not exist and is replaced by the autarkic equilib-
rium, where each bank is disconnected from each other.
In Section 4, the existence of interbank equilibria is established for the two extreme cases of a
perfectly diversiﬁed and a maximally concentrated banking system. Then, it is shown that for a large
set of economies, the size of the set of interbank equilibria under a diversiﬁed banking system is always
strictly larger than that of a concentrated banking system for any level of credit and liquidity risk. This
result indicates that in the presence of aggregate risk, a diversiﬁed banking system is likely to be less
prone to interbank market breakdowns.
Section 5 deﬁnes the welfare properties of interbank and autarkic allocations. When an interbank
equilibrium exists, it gives a higher expected utility to depositors than the autarkic equilibrium, but
importantly, depositors’ welfare is monotonically decreasing in the degree of risk concentration.
Section 6 provides an example extending the model to capture the Shehzad and De Haan (2013)
ﬁndings. Their results suggest that stock prices of large banks were affected more during the crisis
than those of small banks. They also ﬁnd that managerial efﬁciency, loan quality, leverage, and the
volume of outstanding loans affect bank stock prices. Thus, in our extension, risk concentration and
a high probability of interbank market breakdowns is due to risk management diseconomies of scale
and scope affecting large and complex ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, when our model is modiﬁed by
introducing a risk control technology with decreasing returns over a certain investment threshold,
banks will choose a level of risk concentration that increases in size. Such level is higher the larger is
the cost of risk control arising from the internal organization of large and complex ﬁrms. This result
suggests improvement of risk control technologies in large and complex ﬁnancial institutions and in
regulatory bodies may  be policy concerns as important as other polices considered in the literature to
minimize the probability of interbank market breakdowns.
Section 7 concludes. Proofs of all propositions are in the Appendix.
2. The model
There are three periods, t = 0, 1, 2, and one risky asset that yields a random return at date 2 per unit
invested at date 0. It can assume two values, R = Rh, and R = Rl, with the probabilities speciﬁed below.
If a portion of the investment in this asset is liquidated at t = 1, it yields a certain return of  per unit
invested. The fraction of the asset that is liquidated is denoted ˛. It is assumed that Rh > R >  ≥ 1l,5 so
that if storage is available, this technology will be dominated in rate of return in both dates and will
be never used. This is not a strong assumption since in the special case  = 1, the long asset mimics the
storage technology and can be liquidated to satisfy early consumers, as we  deﬁne shortly, or to lend
in the interbank market.
At date 0 consumers are endowed with one unit of the date 0 consumption good, which is assumed
to be invested all in one bank. Consumers are uncertain about their time preferences: with probability
 they are early consumers, who want to consume at date 1 only, and with probability 1 −  they
5 This implies that the expected value of the long asset is greater than one (the return of the storage technology). Furthermore,
with  the possibility to use interbank market, there is no need to hold costly liquidity.
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are late consumers, who want to consume at date 2 only.6 We  assume that depositors have limited
participation in the assets market thereby they need banking intermediation.7 Their preferences are
represented by a utility function U(c), twice continuously differentiable, increasing, and strictly con-
cave. The fraction of early consumers is also random and can assume two  values:  = h, and  = l,
with 1 > h > l > 0.
The banking sector is composed by N ex-ante identical banks that invest consumer’s endowments at
date 0. The banking sector is perfectly competitive, so that banks’ objective is to maximize depositors’
expected utility.
Each bank is exposed to liquidity and credit risk shocks. The realization of both shocks is observed
by a bank at date 1. We  assume there is no aggregate uncertainty, so that the fraction of banks which
is exposed to a given combination of credit and liquidity shocks is deterministic. However, the prob-
abilities (and hence the distribution) of these banks at date 0 depends on an exogenous parameter
 ∈ (0, 1) that indexes the degree of concentration of liquidity and credit risk in the banking system.
Speciﬁcally, the fraction of banks that experience a given pair of realizations of credit and liquidity
risk (R, ) is given by the following table, with p ∈ (0, 1) and q ∈ (0, 1), where p is the probability of a
bank to have a high return and a low liquidity shock and q is the probability of a bank to have a high
return and a high liquidity shock. These probabilities, p and q, are independent.
Thus, as of date 1, there are four types of banks:
Thereafter we refer to parameter  as an index of “risk concentration”.
A fraction of banks p (type 1) experiences a low liquidity shock and a high ﬁnal date return on the
asset; by contrast, a fraction of banks (1 − p) (type 4) experiences the reverse, that is, a high liquidity
shock and a low ﬁnal date return on the asset. Thus, credit risks and liquidity risks are perfectly positively
correlated for type 1 and 4 banks.
Conversely, a fraction of banks (1 − )q (type 2) experiences a high liquidity shock but also a high
ﬁnal date return on the asset, whereas a fraction of banks (1 − )(1 − q) (type 3) a low liquidity shock
but also a low ﬁnal date return on the asset. Thus, credit risk and liquidity risks are perfectly negatively
correlated for type 2 and 3 banks.
If  = 0, then the banking system is made of banks that diversify their credit and liquidity risks. By
contrast, if  = 1, banks concentrate their credit and liquidity risks. As  increases, the banking system
exhibits a higher concentration of risks for any given values of (p, q).
3. Interbank equilibrium
Here we examine how well an interbank market works for any level of risk concentration (i.e. any
).
There is an interbank market where liquidity can be traded at the intermediate date. The amount
of funds that each bank trade in the interbank market is denoted b and the gross interbank rate is
denoted by r.
6 When  = 1, in this case early consumers receive 1 such that in expectation the incentive compatibility constraint is satisﬁed:
i.e.  late consumers receive E[R] > 1.
7 This assumption is standard in the literature starting from the model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
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At date 0, competitive banks maximize the expected utility of depositors. They choose the amount
of borrowing b (if positive, borrowing, if negative, lending) and the amount of asset to liquidate, ˛, to
solve:
Max
˛,b
˘1 = U(c1) + (1 − )U(c2) (1)
Subject to
c1 = ˛ + b (2)
(1 − )c2 = R(1 − ˛) − rb, (3)
where r is the “interbank” rate, to be determined in the t = 1 credit equilibrium.
Assume an interbank equilibrium exists. Substituting (3) in (2) through b,
c1 + (1 − )
c2
r
= ˛ + R
r
(1 − ˛). (4)
The solution ˛* will be the one that makes the bank’s budget constraint the largest, i.e. that makes
the right hand side of (4) the largest. Hence, the solution is given by:
˛∗ = 0 if R
r
>  and ˛∗ = 1 if R
r
< . (5)
Observe that the existence of a storage technology would not affect the conditions to liquidate the
long asset. Indeed, as long as the long asset value at period 1 is lower that , it is always optimal to
liquidate it.
A necessary condition for the existence of an interbank equilibrium is that
r ∈
(
Rl

,
Rh

)
. (6)
This is because if r ≤ Rl , by (4) all banks will not liquidate the investment in the risky technology, and
by (2) they will wish to ﬁnance all date 1 consumption by borrowing. Thus, there would be no lenders,
hence no interbank equilibrium. Likewise, if r ≥ Rh , by (5) all banks will liquidate the investment in
the risky technology, and by (3) they will wish to ﬁnance all date 2 consumption by the repayments
on lending at date 2. But at date 1 there would be no borrowers, hence no interbank equilibrium.
Using (2), (3) and (5) in (1), bank (R, ) solves:
Max
b
˘1 = U
(
˛∗ + b

)
+ (1 − )U
(
R(1 − ˛∗) − rb
1 − 
)
, (1a)
the ﬁrst order condition with respect to b is
U ′
(
˛∗ + b

)
= rU ′
(
R(1 − ˛∗) − rb
1 − 
)
. (7)
Thus, the solution of the bank problem is given by (5) and (7). Note that banks optimal choices are
the liquidation decision ˛*(R), which does not depend on , and b(R, ). The liquidation decision in
response to the credit risk realization does not depend on the liquidity shock (in (5) nothing depends
on ), but the borrowing decision depends on both shocks (by (7)).
We characterize equilibria for log utility preferences, i.e. U(c) = ln(c). The choice of this speciﬁcation
is motivated by simplicity and by the fact that for these preferences, date 1 spot market allocations and
optimal banking allocations generally coincide in liquidity preference frameworks such as ours (see
Allen & Gale, 2007). Our results are robust to more general consumer utility speciﬁcations. It is easy to
see in Eq. (7) that it is sufﬁcient to adopt a consumer’s utility function twice continuously differentiable,
increasing, and strictly concave. Hence, these preferences can be viewed as a useful benchmark to
judge differences in equilibriums and associated welfare properties in diversiﬁed and concentrated
risk economies independently of efﬁciency wedges between market and banking allocations.
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Eq. (7) yields:

˛∗ + b =
r(1 − )
R(1 − ˛∗) − rb .  (8)
Solving (8), we have
b(R, ) = 1
r
(R(1 − ˛∗) − r(1 − )˛∗) . (9)
Since r ∈
(
Rl
 ,
Rh

)
, by (5), optimal asset’s liquidation is ˛*(Rl) = 1 and ˛*(Rh) = 0.
In sum, the four bank types have the following borrowing/lending positions
b(Rl, l) = −(1 − l) (9a)
b(Rl, h) = −(1 − h) (9b)
b(Rh, l) = 1
r
(
lRh
)
(9c)
b(Rh, h) = 1
r
(
hRh
)
, (9d)
and equilibrium in the interbank market requires
p
1
r
lRh + (1 − )q1
r
hRh − (1 − )(1 − q)(1 − l) − (1 − p)(1 − h) = 0. (10)
The above equation (10) is linear with respect to r and has the unique solution:
r∗ =
Rh
(
pl + (1 − )qh
)
[(1 − )(1 − q)(1 − l) + (1 − p)(1 − h)] . (11)
Eq. (11) says that the interbank equilibrium rate raises as the liquidity needs and the opportunity
cost of holding the asset, Rh, increase.
4. Comparisons of equilibria
In this section we identify conditions ensuring existence of equilibria for the extreme values of ,
and compare the set of parameters for which equilibria exists for such values.
Using (11) and r∗ ∈
(
Rl
 ,
Rh

)
, we obtain
1 ≥ p
l + (1 − )qh
(1 − )(1 − q)(1 − l) + (1 − p)(1 − h) ≥
Rl
Rh
. (12)
We  use (12) to assess the existence of interbank equilibria under two extreme cases, that of banking
system’s perfect diversiﬁcation ( = 0), and that of maximal risk concentration in the banking system
( = 1). The main result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. For the perfect diversiﬁed economy ( = 0) and for the perfect concentrated economy
( = 1), the set of interbank equilibria is non-empty for any parameter conﬁguration of credit and liquidity
risk (h, l, Rh, Rl).
Now, we wish to compare the size of the set of economies, indexed by p and q, for which equilibria
exist for  = 0 and for  = 1.
We assess the equilibria domains deﬁning two sets as below detailed. To this scope, we measure
these sets computing the linear extremes [v0, v1] for the case  = 0 and [v1, v11] for  = 1. These extremes
are simply the solutions of Eq. (12) solved at equality.
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Using the right and the left hand side of (12), the equilibrium domains for  = 0, [v0, v10], and for
 = 1, [v1, v11], are respectively[
v0 =
Rl
Rh
(1 − l)
h + Rl
Rh
(1 − l)
,  v10 =
1  − l
1 + h − l
]
(13)
and[
v1 =
Rl
Rh
(1 − h)
l + Rl
Rh
(1 − h)
,  v11 =
1 − h
1 − h + l
]
. (14)
The larger is the interval for which equilibria exists under diversiﬁcation or concentration, the
larger is the set of economies that may  beneﬁt from the risk sharing opportunities offered by the
interbank market.
Consider the difference between the equilibria interval when  = 0 and when  = 1, deﬁned as:
G ≡ 0 − 1 = (v0 − v10) − (v1 − v11). (15)
Computations give:
0 =
h(1 − l)
(
1 − Rl
Rh
)
(1 + h − l)
(
h + Rl
Rh
(1 − l)
) , (16)
and
1 =
l(1 − h)
(
1 − Rl
Rh
)
(1 − h + l)
(
l + Rl
Rh
(1 − h)
) . (17)
Of particular interest is the comparison of the set of equilibria for relatively large credit and liquidity
shocks. This comparison is made clearer by substituting h = l, where 1
l
≥  ≥ 1, and Rl = ˇRh where
ˇ ≤ 1. Parameter  is a measure of the liquidity risk and  ˇ is the credit risk. The smaller is ˇ, the larger is
the difference between high and low return. The larger is  , the larger is the difference between low
and high liquidity shock.
Thus, (15) can be expressed as
G(l, , ˇ) = 
l(1 − l)
(1 + l − l)
(
l + ˇ(1 − l)
) − l(1 − l)
(1 − l + l)
(
l + ˇ(1 − l)
) . (18)
The following proposition establishes a ranking of the size of equilibria under a diversiﬁed economy
and a risk-concentrated economy.
Proposition 2. There exists a l such that for l ≥ l and any (ˇ,) the set of interbank equilibrium
under the diversiﬁed economy is always strictly larger than for the concentrated economy.
When liquidity shocks are large, the set of interbank equilibria of the diversiﬁed economy is larger
than the corresponding set of the risk-concentrated economy and the interbank equilibrium is likely
to break down for more model parameter ranges. Therefore, a diversiﬁed economy offers a better
insurance against high liquidity and credit risk. Finally note that by (18), for  ˇ =  = 1, which amounts
to absence of credit and liquidity risk, G(1, 1) = 0, then the two  sets are equivalent. This means that
bank market structure is important especially when the shocks are high.
Fig. 1 shows graphically the result of Proposition 2 for a set of economies. The surface representing
the function G(l,  , ˇ) is increasing in liquidity risk.
As Fig. 1 highlights, the set of equilibria is increasing in the degree of banks’ risk diversiﬁcation for
a liquidity risk greater that ¯l . This indicates that an interbank is less likely to break-down when the
economy is more diversiﬁed.
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Fig. 1. Behavior of G(l ,  , ˇ).
5. Welfare comparisons
We  want to compare agents’ welfare in economies with banking systems differing according to
market structure and risk concentration. To do that, we  compute depositors’ expected utility.
Using (2) and (3), the consumption in states 1 and 2 is
c1 =
˛ + b

(19)
and
c2 =
R(1 − ˛) − rb
1 −  . (20)
Substituting equilibrium values ˛, b and r in (19) and (20), we  obtain the consumption allocation
offered by different bank types, Ctype(i) = (ctype(i)1 , c
type(i)
2 ) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4:
Ctype(1) =
([
(1 − )(1 − q)(1 − l) + (1 − p)(1 − h)
]

pl + (1 − )qh , R
h
)
(21a)
Ctype(2) =
([
(1 − )(1 − q)(1 − l) + (1 − p)(1 − h)
]

pl + (1 − )qh , R
h
)
(21b)
Ctype(3) =
(
,
Rh
(
pl + (1 − )qh
)
(1 − )(1 − q)(1 − l) + (1 − p)(1 − h)
)
(21c)
Ctype(4) =
(
,
Rh
(
pl + (1 − )qh
)
(1 − )(1 − q)(1 − l) + (1 − p)(1 − h)
)
. (21d)
The ex-ante the expected utility of a representative consumer is therefore
W ≡
4∑
i=1
P(type(i))U(ctype(i)1 , c
type(i)
2 ) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. (22)
Equivalently:
W ≡ pU(Ctype(1)) + (1 − )qU(Ctype(2)) + (1 − )(1 − q)U(Ctype(3)) + (1 − p)U(Ctype(4)). (23)
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Fig. 2. The behavior of W as a function of  and liquidity risk  .
Unfolding (23) we get:
W ≡ p
(
l log
([
(1 − )(1 − q)(1 − l) + (1 − p)(1 − h)
]

pl + (1 − )qh
)
+ (1 − l) log(Rh)
)
+ (1 − )q
(
h log
([
(1 − )(1 − q)(1 − l) + (1 − p)(1 − h)
]

pl + (1 − )qh
)
+ (1 − h) log(Rh)
)
+ (1 − )(1 − q)
(
l log() + (1 − l) log
(
Rh
(
pl + (1 − )qh
)
(1 − )(1 − q)(1 − l) + (1 − p)(1 − h)
))
+ (1 − p)
(
h log() + (1 − h) log
(
Rh
(
pl + (1 − )qh
)
(1 − )(1 − q)(1 − l) + (1 − p)(1 − h)
))
(24)
Fig. 2 shows W for given return parameters. Note that W is decreasing both in  and in the liquidity
risk parameter  .
Fig. 2 shows that welfare decreases when banking system risk is concentrated and liquidity risk is
high. The corner representing high levels of  and  can be viewed as a “crisis” set of risk realizations
with high welfare losses.
When the interbank equilibrium does not exist, the autarkic allocation will prevail. Depositors’
expected utility under autarky is given by the solution of the following problem:
Max
˛
WA = U(c1) + (1 − )U(c2) (1b)
Subject to
c1 = ˛ (2b)
(1 − )c2 = R(1 − ˛). (3b)
The optimal solution is ˛* = . Therefore, substituting in (2b) and (3b), the consumption allocations
for each bank type at an autarkic equilibrium are:
Ctype(1) = Ctype(2) =
(
, Rh
)
(25a)
Ctype(3) = Ctype(4) =
(
, Rl
)
. (25b)
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Fig. 3. Behavior of W and WA with different liquidity shocks.
Correspondingly, the expected utility of an agent at the initial date is:
WA ≡ p[l log() + (1 − l) log(Rh)] + (1 − )q[l log() + (1 − l) log(Rh)]
+ (1 − )(1 − q)[l log() + (1 − l) log(Rl)] + (1 − p)[l log() + (1 − l) log(Rl)]
(26)
Fig. 3 shows W,  the expected utility when the interbank equilibrium exists, and WA, the expected
utility under autarky, as functions of  and  for two sets of economies. For high values of risk con-
centration and liquidity risk the interbank equilibrium does not exist, as WA > W.  When the interbank
surface lies over the autarky plane, the interbank equilibrium exists since W > WA for all parameter
values, with W strictly decreasing in the degree of risk concentration .
Fig. 3 illustrates the general ﬁnding summarized in the following proposition 3. The ﬁgure describes
the existence of the interbank market and the welfare behavior for different levels of risk concentration
and liquidity shocks. The corner with high liquidity shocks and high concentration is a crisis. In this
case the interbank market will not exist since the autarky equilibrium (the plane WA) gives higher
welfare than the interbank equilibrium.
Proposition 3. (a) There exists ( ¯, ¯) such that WA > W for all (, ) > ( ¯, ¯).
(b) When W > WA the interbank equilibrium exists, and W is strictly decreasing in  for any  .
It is useful to illustrate examples for different set of economies. Fig. 4 clearly shows that when 
is high and liquidity risk,  , is sufﬁciently high, the interbank allocation is dominated by the autarky
allocation.
Fig. 5 shows that with high credit risk, i.e. low probability of realization of the high return, the
interbank market is more likely to exist than the autarky allocation. This suggests that interbank
markets insure against credit risk also, while W remains decreasing with respect to .
The pictures 3, 4 and 5 highlight that welfare always decreases when the economy exhibits a high
risks concentration and high liquidity exposure.
6. An example of endogenous degree of risk concentration
So far the degree of risk concentration in the banking system (parameter ) has been treated as
exogenous. We  have shown that welfare decreases in the degree of market concentration. For all
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Fig. 4. W and WA with relatively high p and q.
Fig. 5. W and WA with relatively low p and q.
examples shown, the highest depositors’ expected utility is reached at the minimum level of risk
concentration ( = 0).
Recall that  is a parameter that determines the probabilities of credit and liquidity shocks as of
date 0. Therefore, a choice of  can be viewed as a bank choice of credit and liquidity risk. If achieving
perfect diversiﬁcation at a system level is costless, then in a perfectly competitive banking system,
banks would choose the minimum level of risk concentration and the probability of interbank market
breakdowns would be minimized.
In reality, Shehzad and De Haan (2013) suggest that stock prices of large banks were affected
more during the crisis than those of small banks and they also ﬁnd that managerial efﬁciency, loan
quality, leverage, and the volume of outstanding loans affect bank stock prices. Literally, achieving
diversiﬁcation and controlling risk is costly, since risk management can be viewed as a technology
available to ﬁrms similar, for example, to the technology underlying credit risk models. As the size
and scope of the operations of banks expands, ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ span of control over their many units can
become less efﬁcient in controlling risk. In this light, a lack of sufﬁcient banking system diversiﬁcation
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and a higher probability of interbank market breakdowns may  be in part due to risk control diseconomies
of scale and scope.
The potential for ﬁrst order effects of risk management diseconomies of scale and scope on risk
concentration in the banking system, and their relationship with bank size, can be illustrated by the
following modiﬁcation of our model.
Suppose at date 0 banks have a size S ≥ 0, and choose  employing part of date 0 resources. Specif-
ically, they invest a fraction x of date resources in the technology and choose  incurring a cost z()S
as a fraction of date 0 resources, where  > 0 is the scale cost parameter. Their resource constraint at
date 0 is therefore:
x + z()S = S (27)
Assume z() = a0 + a1, with a0 and a1 as positive coefﬁcients. This function can be interpreted
as a cost function of a risk control technology that exhibits decreasing returns to investment over a
certain threshold. Its parameters could depend on size and scope of ﬁnancial ﬁrms operations, as well
as on incentives arising from asymmetric information, market power and other factors pointed out in
the literature, which may  in turn be affected by ﬁrms’ size.
To compute W(), we replace 1 with S(1 − z()S) in the consumption allocations,
c1 =
˛S(1 − z()S) + b

(28)
and
c2 =
R(1 − ˛)S(1 − z()S) − rb
1 −  . (29)
Then, optimal borrowing/lending choices in the interbank market are:
b(R, ) = S(1 − z()S
)
r
(R(1 − ˛∗) − r(1 − )˛∗) , (30)
With the liquidation choices  ˛ unchanged, the equilibrium in the interbank market is the solution
of the following equation:
p
S(1 − z()S)
r
lRh + (1 − )qS(1 − z()S
)
r
hRh − (1 − )(1 − q)S(1 − z()S)(1 − l)
− (1 − p)S(1 − z()S)(1 − h) = 0, (31)
which yields
r∗ =
Rh
(
pl + (1 − )qh
)
[(1 − )(1 − q)(1 − l) + (1 − p)(1 − h)] . (32)
Note that (32) is equivalent to (11), meaning that the equilibrium interbank rate does not depend
on the function S(1 − z()S). This means that in the market for liquidity is the excess of demand
on supply that determines interbank rate. Multiplying both demand and supply for the size function
would not affect the equilibrium interbank rate.
The consumption allocations for the four bank types which allow us to compute depositors’
expected utility are:
Ctype(1) =
([
(1 − )(1 − q)(1 − l) + (1 − p)(1 − h)
]
S(1 − z()S)
pl + (1 − )qh , R
hS(1 − z()S)
)
(33a)
M. Lucchetta / North American Journal of Economics and Finance 33 (2015) 149–166 161
Fig. 6. Expected utility W with costs of risk control  = 1 and S = 4.
Ctype(2) =
([
(1 − )(1 − q)(1 − l) + (1 − p)(1 − h)
]
S(1 − z()S)
pl + (1 − )qh , R
hS(1 − z()S)
)
(33b)
Ctype(3) =
(
S(1 − z()S),
Rh
(
pl + (1 − )qh
)
S(1 − z()S)
(1 − )(1 − q)(1 − l) + (1 − p)(1 − h)
)
(33c)
Ctype(4) =
(
S(1 − z()S),
Rh
(
pl + (1 − )qh
)
S(1 − z()S)
(1 − )(1 − q)(1 − l) + (1 − p)(1 − h)
)
. (33d)
Fig. 6 shows (with different angles) an example of the expected utility function W as a function of 
and the liquidity risk parameter  . It is apparent that function W is strictly concave, with a maximum
for  as an interior point. We  plot the surface for size parameter S = 4 and  = 1.
Proposition 4. For any value of  and for a given level of liquidity risk ¯ , the optimal bank risk concen-
tration level * is increasing in S.
Proposition 4 states that the scale parameter  is the determinant of the degree of diversiﬁcation
that a bank chooses, and bank diversiﬁcation is inversely related to its assets size.
Fig. 6 shows the concavity property of the welfare function in the case of costly diversiﬁcation. This
implies the choice of a  different from 0.
Fig. 7 shows the optimal  for different bank size. The maximum of the expected utility is different
according to S. The concentration is greater for a bank size larger than one. By contrast, for a small
bank size the optimal risk concentration approaches zero.
Therefore, the optimal level of risk concentration might be larger than the minimum feasible. In
turn, risk concentration is larger for a larger bank size. The level of a0 and a1 may  depend fundamentally
on market structure, that is on the distribution of ﬁrms by size. As a result, any incentive to increase
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Fig. 7. Expected utility W for S = 1 and S = 4.
ﬁnancial ﬁrms’ size, such as too-big-to-fail incentives, may  carry higher risk control costs, which in
turn could result in a higher level of risk concentration in the banking system.
7. Conclusion
Our model shows that risk concentration seems of ﬁrst order importance for the smooth functioning
of interbank markets. Risk concentration may  increase in bank size under reasonable assumptions
about the risk management technology available to banks. Differing from most literature, our results
are obtained in a model with no asymmetric information, no market power or dysfunctional secondary
markets.
With regard to policy, the literature has prominently focused on the important role of the Central
Bank as lender of last resort when interbank market breakdowns occur (see e.g. Freixas, Parigi, & Jean-
Charles, 2000; Freixas, Antoine, & Skeie, 2009; Goodhart & Illing, 2002; Repullo, 2005). Our model
suggests that the improvement of risk management technologies in large and complex ﬁnancial insti-
tutions, as well as in regulatory bodies, may  be as important to minimize the occurrence of interbank
market breakdowns.
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Appendix.
Proposition 1. For the perfectly diversiﬁed economy ( = 0) and for the perfectly concentrated econ-
omy  ( = 1), the set of interbank equilibrias is non-empty for any parameter conﬁguration of credit and
liquidity risk (h, l, Rh, Rl).
Proof.  The left-hand side inequality of (12) can be expressed as:
(1 − )(1 + h − l)q ≤ (1 − )(1 − l) + (1 − h) − p(1 − h + l), (A1)
If  = 0, then (1 + h − l)q ≤ (1 − l) (A2)
If  = 1, then 0 ≤ (1 − h) − p(1 − h + l) (A3)
The right-hand side inequality of (12) can be expressed as:
(1 − )(h + R
l
Rh
(1 − l)) ≥ R
l
Rh
[(1 − h) + (1 − )(1 − l)] − p[(1 − h) R
l
Rh
+ l] (A4)
If  = 0, then q
(
h + R
l
Rh
(1 − l)
)
≥ R
l
Rh
(1 − l) (A5)
If  = 1, then 0 ≥ R
l
Rh
(1 − h) − p[(1 − h) R
l
Rh
+ l] (A6)
Thus, the set of economies for which an interbank equilibrium exists is indexed by q ∈ [0, 1] if  = 0,
and by p ∈ [0, 1] if  = 1.
If  = 0, using (A2) and (A5), we get:
Rl
Rh
(1 − l)
h + Rl
Rh
(1 − l)
≤ q ≤ 1 − 
l
1 + h − l . (A7)
Therefore, if  = 0, the set of interbank equilibria is non-empty if
1 − l
1 + h − l ≥
Rl
Rh
(1 − l)
h + Rl
Rh
(1 − l)
.  (A8)
Inequality (A8) implies that (1 − l)(h + Rl
Rh
(1 − l)) ≥ Rl
Rh
(1 − l)(1 + h − l), which can be fur-
ther simpliﬁed to h ≥ Rl
Rh
h, which in turn is always veriﬁed since R
l
Rh
< 1.
If  = 1, using (A3) and (A6) we get:
1 − h
1 − h + l ≥ p ≥
Rl
Rh
(1 − h)
l + Rl
Rh
(1 − h)
.  (A9)
Inequality (A9) is always satisﬁed, since it reduces to l ≥ Rl
Rh
l , which holds as R
l
Rh
< 1.
Proposition 2. There exists a l such that for l ≥ l and any ( , ˇ) the set of interbank equilibrium
under the diversiﬁed economy is always strictly larger than for the concentrated economy.
Proof. Differentiating (18) with respect to l, and evaluating the derivative at l = 1:
Gl (0,  , ˇ) 	
( − 1)
(
4(1 + ˇ)2 + 2ˇ(1 + 5ˇ) − 3ˇ2 − (1 + 7  ˇ + 8ˇ2)
)
( − 2)2(ˇ( − 1) − 1)2
, (A10)
since ( − 1) > 0 and ( − 2)2(ˇ( − 1) − 1)2 > 0, (A10) is positive if
4(1 + ˇ)2 + 2ˇ(1 + 5ˇ) > 3ˇ2 + (1 + 7  ˇ + 8ˇ2). (A11)
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Observe that for l → 1,  → 1, then (A11) reduces to
3 + 2ˇ > 0. (A12)
Therefore, there exist values of ¯l and ¯ such that for l ≥ l and for  ≥ ¯ the function G(l,  , ˇ)
is increasing.
Proposition 3. (c) There exists ( ¯, ¯) such that WA > W for all (, ) > ( ¯, ¯);
(d) When W > WA the interbank equilibrium exists, and W,  is strictly decreasing in  for any  .
Proof. We  prove part (a) and (b) separately.
(a) There is a (, ) > ( ¯, ¯) such that the autarky allocation dominates the interbank equilibrium.
The expected utility under autarky for  = 0 and for  = 1 are
WA0 ≡ q[l log() + (1 − l) log(Rh)] + (1 − q)[l log() + (1 − l) log(Rl)], (A13)
and
WA1 ≡ p[l log() + (1 − l) log(Rh)] + (1 − p)[l log() + (1 − l) log(Rl)]. (A14)
Hence, we  compare the expected utility within a diversify economy between interbank allocation
and autarky allocation
W0 − WA0 ≡ q
(
l log
(
(1 − q)(1 − l)
ql
)
+ (1 − l) log(Rh)
)
+ (1 − q)
(
l log() + (1 − l) log
(
Rhql
(1 − q)(1 − l)
))
−
{
q[l log() + (1 − l) log(Rh)]
+ (1 − q)[l log() + (1 − l) log(Rl)]
}
⇒ q
(
l
(
log
(
(1 − q)(1 − l)
ql
)
− log()
))
+ (1 − q)
(
(1 − l)
(
log
(
Rhql
(1 − q)(1 − l)
)
− log(Rl)
))
, (A15)
The difference of expected utility in a risk concentrated economy between the interbank allocation
and autarky allocation is
W1 − WA1 ≡ p
(
l log
(
(1 − p)(1 − l)
pl
)
+ (1 − l) log(Rh)
)
+ (1 − p)
(
l log()
+(1 − l) log
(
Rhpl
(1 − p)(1 − l)
))
−
{
p[l log() + (1 − l) log(Rh)]
+ (1 − p)[l log() + (1 − l) log(Rl)]
}
⇒ p
(
l
(
log
(
(1 − p)(1 − l)
pl
)
− log()
))
+ (1 − p)
(
(1 − l)
(
log
(
Rhpl
(1 − p)(1 − l)
)
− log(Rl)
))
. (A16)
Computing (A15) and (A16) for  → 1
l
, W0 − WA0 > 0, and W1 − WA1 < 0. Then, we  conclude that
there exist a couple (, ) > ( ¯, ¯) such that the autarky allocation gives a higher expected utility than
the interbank market equilibrium.
(b) When we have an interbank equilibrium, the expected utility decreases in . Take the derivative
of (24) with respect to  and compute it for  → 1 and for  → 1
l
,
W→1
(
 → 1
l
)
→ − < 0. (A17)
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Compute the derivative also for l → 0
W→1
(
l → 0
)
< 0. (A18)
Therefore, as risk concentration increases, the expected utility in the interbank economy is
decreasing. Moreover, the expected utility for  = 0 and for  = 1 are
W0 ≡ q
(
l log
(
(1 − q)(1 − l)
ql
)
+ (1 − l) log(Rh)
)
+ (1 − q)
(
l log() + (1 − l) log
(
Rhql
(1 − q)(1 − l)
))
(A19)
and
W1 ≡ p
(
l log
(
(1 − p)(1 − l)
pl
)
+ (1 − l) log(Rh)
)
+ (1 − p)
(
l log() + (1 − l) log
(
Rhpl
(1 − p)(1 − l)
))
. (A20)
Let  → 1
l
, the difference of expected utilities is
W0 − W1 = q
(
log
(
(1 − q)(1 − l)
q
))
+ (1 − q)
(
l log() + (1 − l) log
(
Rhq
(1 − q)(1 − l)
))
−
(
p
(
l log(	 0) + (1 − l) log(Rh)
)
+ (1 − p) log()
)
> 0, (A21)
since W1
(
 → 1
l
)
< 0 and W0
(
 → 1
l
)
> 0.
Let l → 0,
W0 − W1 → 0. (A22)
We  conclude that for any  the expected utility decreases in concentration, .
Proposition 4. For any value of  and for a given level of liquidity risk ¯ , the optimal bank risk concen-
tration level * is increasing in S.
Proof.  Take the optimal * solving W for a given level of liquidity risk ¯ and for p = q = 0.5. For S → 0,
we have that * → 0 and for S→ ∞ * → 1.
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